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THE RHETORIC OF RESTRAINT AND THE
IDEOLOGY OF ACTIVISM
Stefanie A. Lindquist*
Joseph L. Smith**
Frank B. Cross***
Criticism of judicial activism has become commonplace in
political debate. In recent years it has been political conservatives who have most often sounded the alarm that unelected, activist judges are intruding on the prerogatives of the elected
branches. This criticism traces to the Warren Court era, when
conservatives called for "judicial restraint" or "strict constructionism" in place of liberal judicial activism, contending that
"when liberal Courts overturn democratically enacted laws in favor of liberal, activist constitutionalism, they destroy citizens'
1
rights to democratic participation and self-government. " According to these critics, "liberal, activist judges" substitute their
2
personal preferences for the will of the people.
The controversy over judicial activism has become an important issue in recent election campaigns, as well as a central
concern in debates over Supreme Court nominations. In 2004,
for example, former Attorney General John Ashcroft claimed
that "intrusive judicial oversight and second-guessing of presidential determinations ... can put at risk the very security of our
nation in a time of war."' While much of the attack on judicial
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2. Lori A. Ringhand. Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Belun·ior on !he Rehnquisl Nanmrl Court. 24 CONST. COMMENT. 143 (2007). The critique of
activism has been wielded by conservatives. such that "whenever a politician uses the
term 'activist judge.' the word liberal 1s sure to follow." Thomas Healey. The Rise of" Un.
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activism is populist in nature, academics and judges-such as
Robert Bork, Charles Fried, Antonin Scalia and Michael
McConnell-make similar arguments. Professor McConnell, for
example, has objected that "rule by judges" is "inconsistent with
the principles of self-government."• At the time of his appointment, Justice Scalia expressed concern about an "imperial judiciary."'
Yet the claim that conservative judges are more restrained
than their liberal counterparts has also been challenged, especially in connection with decisions rendered by the Rehnquist
Court. The National Director of the ACLU declared that the
Rehnquist Court had become "one of the most activist courts in
American history."" Critics of the Rehnquist Court have claimed
that conservative justices were quite activist when the substantive outcome satisfied their ideological preferences.
Justices may find restraint more palatable when they agree
with the policy consequences of the government action being
evaluated. Indeed, the potential for conflict between the justices'
substantive ideological orientations and their professed belief in
judicial restraint may manifest itself along several institutional
dimensions. Conservative justices' substantive preferences for
conservative policies may conflict with legislative, gubernatorial
or judicial policy choices made at the state level (see Bush v.
Gore, for example), all of which may be produced by elected
bodies in the states. In this situation, not only are conservative
justices faced with a conflict that implicates their commitment to
judicial restraint, but to federalism as well. Or the justices' preferences may conflict with outcomes produced by the coordinate
branches in the federal government. Thus, the justices may be
faced with constitutional challenges to federal legislation, or to
constitutional or statutory challenges to federal administrative
actions, that require them to evaluate the propriety of decisions
rendered by the elected Congress and the President. In these
situations, the justices must decide whether to defer to the
elected branches or substitute their own judgments for those of
elected officials. Yet in doing so, they may find they face a ten-

4. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Tramforming
Moral Convictions IIllo Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989).
5. Jean Morgan Meaux, Justice Scalia and .lwlicial Restrailll: A Conservative Resolution of Conflict Between Individual and State, 62 TUL. L. REV. 225. 227 (1987).
6. Edward Walsh. An Activist Court Mixes lt.1· High-Profile Messages. WASH.
POST, July 2. 2000, at A6.
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sion between their preference about the substantive law or policy at issue and their commitment to judicial restraint.
In this paper, we explore these various dimensions by focusing on the degree to which conservative rhetoric advocating
judicial deference to the policy actions of the elected branches
(at the federal and state levels) actually comports with reality. In
particular, we focus on (1) the extent to which the rhetoric of judicial restraint characterizes the voting behavior of conservative
justices faced with constitutional challenges to federal and state
statutory law, and (2) the extent to which such rhetoric is consistent with conservative justices' voting behavior in cases raising
challenges to the administrative actions of the executive branch
at the federal level. In our analysis, we equate judicial restraint
with a tendency to uphold the decisions of legislators and federal
administrative agencies.
We find that, although in both instances conservative justices were somewhat more "restrainist" toward legislative and
executive action, that restraint was contingent on the source of
the law at issue. Thus, after controlling for ideological preferences regarding the substantive policies challenged in the cases,
conservative justices were more deferential to state (as opposed
to federal) legislation, and to action by executive branch (as opposed to independent regulatory) agencies. These findings suggest that countervailing considerations may actually explain the
conservatives' "restraintist orientation": (1) their ideological
commitment to state power and principles of federalism, and (2)
their ideological commitment to a powerful executive branch.
Indeed, when read in tandem, our results reflect a conservatism
that is particularly critical of congressional power.
I. DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

Activism may take several forms. In his seminal article,
Brad Canon defines six dimensions of judicial activism: (1) the
degree to which policies adopted through democratic processes
are judicially invalidated, (2) the degree to which earlier court
decisions, doctrines or interpretations are altered, (3) the degree
to which constitutional provisions are interpreted contrary to
clear language or original intent, (4) the degree to which judicial
decisions make substantive policy rather than preserve democratic processes, (5) the degree to which the judiciary eliminates
discretion of other governmental actors and makes policy itself,
and (6) the degree to which judicial decisions preclude serious
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consideration of governmental problems by other political actors.7
Given the federal structure of our government, countermajoritarian activism itself has two dimensions. Judicial review may
be invoked to invalidate federal or state laws; however, the invalidation of a federal law implicates somewhat different concerns than the invalidation of a state law or local ordinance.
When the justices wield their power of judicial review to strike a
federal statute, their action implicates separation of powers issues because the Court's decision challenges policy choices made
by the coordinate branches. Similarly, when the justices invalidate decisions and actions of the federal administrative agencies,
they encroach on the President's policy making authority within
the executive branch. Such actions raise the potential for recriminations by Congress and the President, including reversal
through constitutional amendment or restrictions on judicial
budgets, among other things.' Moreover, in terms of majoritarianism, an act of Congress or the President at least arguably
represents the will of the majority of U.S. citizens, rather than
the majority of citizens within a particular state. Thus invalidation of congressional enactments and federal administrative decisions has more immediate national implications and thus
broader countermajoritarian consequences. In contrast, Canon
suggests that voiding state laws is "arguably less offensive in
principle. ,Y Practically, however, he recognizes that invalidation
of a state or local law may also have national consequences to
the extent such a ruling calls into question similar laws in other
jurisdictions. Of course, such rulings are also "countermajoritarian" at the state or local level as well, and have the potential
to alter the balance of power between the federal and state governments.

7. Bradley C. Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism. 66
JUDICATURE 236.239 (1983).
8. See, e.g .. James Meernik & Joseph lgnagni. Judicial Rn·iew ami Coordinate
Construction of the Constillltion .. 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 447 (1997). On the question
whether the Court responds to potential retribution by Congress. see Jeffrey A. Segal.
Separation of Power Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts. 91 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 28 (1997): on Congressional responses to Supreme Court decisions on the constitutionality of federal statutes. see Meernik & lgnagni. supra.
9. See Canon. supra note 7. at 241.
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II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF ACTIVISM AND
RESTRAINT
This section presents empirical data on the degree to which
judges appear activist or restrained in reviewing legislation or
administrative actions. We begin with a simple count of the relative frequency with which individual justices vote to strike a
statute or decline to defer to an administrative agency decision,
reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Proportion of Votes Invalidating
Legislation or Agency Action, By Justice
Votes to Invalidate
Statutory Enactments

Votes to Invalidate
Agency Action

Blackmun

.544

.367

Brennan
Breyer
Ginsburg

.617

.480

.441

.298

.468

.310

Kennedy

.481

.358

Marshall
O'Connor

.572

.488

.435

.412

Powell

.310

.300

Rehnquist

.283

.280

Scalia

.415

.368

Souter
Stevens
Thomas
White

.527

.370

.534

.391

.439

.431

.316

.183

Justice

A cursory look at these statistics provides some support for
the assertion that conservative justices show more restraint. Justices White, Rehnquist, and Powell appear particularly deferential, while Marshall and Brennan were more aggressively activist.
All the justices were more likely to strike legislation than agency
action, although the relative difference varied widely among the
justices. The association between conservatism and restraint is
not strong, and the activism probabilities for Ginsberg and
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Breyer are not materially different from those for Thomas and
Scalia.
Descriptive or bivariate statistics like those in Table 1 are
suggestive, but they may generate false conclusions because of
the absence of control variables that provide alternative explanations for the votes. For example, this frequency distribution fails
to account for the source of the statute or agency decision and
the ideological direction of the enactment or agency action under review.
In the following section, therefore, we use multivariate regression to compare the effects of several factors likely to influence the justices' votes in cases involving challenges to legislative
enactments and agency action. These more comprehensive models include variables that account for the influence of ideology
and the source of the policy at issue, while controlling for other
factors that might influence judicial behavior in these important
cases. We begin with our model of judicial review of legislation
at the state and federal level, and then turn our attention to judicial review of administrative agencies.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Many of the most controversial Supreme Court decisions,
and those most likely to be condemned as activist, involve invalidation of legislation on constitutional grounds. The central
purpose of this article is to examine the historic claims of judicial
restraint by conservatives. Consequently, our primary hypothesis
is that more conservative justices will be less likely to vote to invalidate statutes on constitutional grounds. We recognize, however, that the decision to invalidate a statute may be shaped by
federalism concerns. Indeed, one of the Rehnquist Court's most
distinguishing characteristics is its preoccupation with federalism
and states' rights, 1" and most of the Court's pro-state-rights decisions may be attributed to the influence of the conservative justices on the Court. Our second hypothesis, therefore, is that conservative justices will be less likely to vote to strike state legislation.
In addition, however, we also seek to evaluate whether the justices' alleged commitment to restraint is contingent on their attitudinal reaction to the legislative policy at issue. Without ques10. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.. The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Calvin Massey. Federalism and the
Rehnquist Court. 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002): Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They
Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001).
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tion, the justices' votes are often substantially influenced by their
ideolopical preferences regarding the substance of individual
cases. 1 Our third hypothesis is that justices will be more likely
vote to uphold legislative enactments whose substantive policies
conform to the justices' ideological preferences. In addition to
these hypothesized influences on the justices' voting behavior, to
control for their effects, we also included other independent
variables that have a likely influence on the justices' votes. These
control variables are explained below.
To evaluate our hypotheses, we coded the justices' votes in
all cases heard by the Rehnquist Court during the 1986 through
2004 Terms in which the constitutionality of a federal, state or
local statute was challenged. The dependent variable is dichotomous, coded as 1 if the justice voted to strike the statute and 0
12
otherwise. Our data included 2465 votes for analysis (1600 in
cases involving state legislation, and 865 in cases involving federal legislation). We present three models: (1) Model 1 is estimated based solely on the justices' votes in cases involving federal statutes; (2) Model 2 is estimated based on the justices'
votes in response to challenges to state or local laws; and (3)
Model 3 includes the votes of the justices in both federal and
state/local cases. Because our dependent variable is dichotomous, we estimate the models using logistic regression with robust standard errors, clustering on the individual justice.
1. Variables and Measurement
. Justice Ideo~ogy. !o '?easure. the )ustices' ideology, we r~hed on the Martm-Qumn Ideal pomts, · arranged such that positive scores are associated with liberal justices, negative scores
with conservative justices. Although the Martin Quinn scores are
calculated based on the justices' voting behavior, and thus may
raise endogeneity problems for some analyses, we are less concerned about that problem with respect to our model. In particular, we are not predicting the ideological direction of the justices'
votes, but rather whether they voted to strike a challenged stat-

11.

JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH. THE SUPRE\1E COURT AND THE

ATfiTL:DI~AL MODEL REVISITED (2002).

12. We are grateful to Rorie Spill Solberg. who was instrumental in collecting these
data in connection with another co-authored project regarding judicial review.
13. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn. Dvnamic Ideal Poim Estimation via
Markov Chain Monte Corio jin the US. Supreme Cr~urt. /1)53-f'J'JI). ]() POL ANALYSIS
134 (2002).
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ute. Use of the Martin Quinn scores to construct an independent
variable does not raise the same degree of concern.
According to the conventional wisdom, conservative justices
on the Rehnquist Court are attitudinally predisposed to reduce
federal power vis-a-vis the states and to enhance or protect state
1
authority. " We thus test the relationship between ideology and
the propensity to strike legislation (i.e. be "activist") in the following fashion. Because higher values of Justice Ideology indicate more liberal justices, a positive coefficient on this variable
will indicate that conservative justices are less likely than liberal
ones to vote to declare laws unconstitutional (therefore support
the first hypothesis). In Model 1, a positive coefficient on the
Justice Ideology variable will indicate that conservatives are less
likely to vote to strike federal laws. In Model 2, a positive coefficient on the Justice Ideology variable will indicate that conservatives are less likely to vote to strike state/local laws. In Model 3,
these relationships are subjected to an additional statistical test.
In that model, the Justice Ideology measure is multiplied by a
dummy variable indicating whether the statute is federal (coded
1) or state/local (coded 0). As a result, in Model 3, the coefficient
on the ideology variable alone indicates the impact of justice ideology in cases involving state or local legislation. A significant coefficient on the interactive term (Ideology*Federal Statute),
moreover, will indicate that the effect ideology is different depending on the source of the law being evaluated.
In addition to the justices' ideological response to the
source of the statute at issue, we also hypothesized that justices'
propensity to strike state or federal legislation will be shaped by
their preferences for the policy embodied in the challenged law.
The variable Alignment with Statutory Direction (hereafter
Alignment) therefore measures the degree of ideological agreement between the justice and the statutory enactment. To construct this variable, we assigned an ideological score to the individual statutes using the directionality codes in the U.S. Supreme
Court Database. Liberal statutes received a value of 1, and conservative statutes -1. To construct a variable measuring the con-

14. See, e g. Calvin Massey. Federalism and the Rehnquist Court. 53 HASTINGS L.J.
431 (2002): Ernest A. Young. The Rehnqui.11 Court's Two Federalisms. H3 TEX. L. REV. 1
(2004). Some have questioned the sincerity of the Court's commitment to federalism.
however. suggesting that it was a mere front for conservative policy preferences. See. e.g ..
Richard H. Fallon. Jr .. The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions. 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002): Peter J. Smith, Federalism. Instrumentalism, and
the Legacv of the Rehnquist Court. 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906 (2006).
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sistency between the statute and the justice's ideologies, we simply multiplied the statute's ideology score and the individual justices' ideology score. Thus, the more extreme the justice's ideology (and therefore the more extreme the justice's Martin-Quinn
Score), the more extreme the value of Alignment. Positive values
on this variable indicate that the justice supports the substantive
goals of the legislation at issue, negative values the opposite. We
therefore expect its coefficient to be negative (where support is
high, the justice will be Jess likely to vote to strike).
Age of Statute. The variables described above are of central
relevance to our working hypothesis, but the literature also directs us to other control variables that may influence the justices'
votes. First, the justices may also be influenced by a statute's age.
In his early study, Dahl presented findings that the bulk of cases
in which federal legislation were declared unconstitutional occurred more than four years after the legislation was enacted,
and suggested that the Court was reluctant to invalidate legisla1
tion enacted by the "live" or current national majority. ' Because
we expect the justices to be more reluctant to invalidate laws
from more recently elected legislative bodies, we included a
variable in our models reflecting the age of the statutory enactment. We expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
Solicitor General. The influence of the Solicitor General at
1
the Supreme Court is well documented, " whether participating
as amicus curaie or representing the federal government directly.17 The Solicitor's high win rate reflects a unique level of
deference that is due either to institutional respect for the Executive Branch or the Court's recognition of legal expertise of
the office. Our models thus include three dummy variables (Solicitor involvement as amicus supporting the statute at issue, as
amicus opposed to the statute, or as party representative) reflecting the Solicitor's Office presence in a given case.
Amicus Differential. The Court may also be influenced by
interest groups appearing via amicus briefs. Some research suggests that amicus curiae have an influence on outcomes before
15. Robert Dahl. Dt:cision-making in 11 Democran: The Supreme Courl liS 11 Nlltionlll Policv-m11ker. li J. PUB. L. 279 (1957).
lli. See, e.g. RICHARD PACELLE. BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR
GEl\ERAL AND THE STRl;CTLJRit\G OF RACE. GEt\DER. AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
LITIGATION (2003).
17. Seth P. Waxman. Fore~<·orr/: Does the Solicitor General M11//erJ. 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1115. 1117 (2001 ): David A. Strauss. The Solicitor General 1111d the Interest.\· of the
United States. li1 LAW & CONTE~fP. PROBS .. Winter/Spring 199H. at 165. 172 (discussing
the Solicitor's reputation at the Court).

112

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:103

the Court.'o We capture this possible influence through the differential support of amici for the parties challenging or supporting the statute, measured as the number of amicus briefs supporting the statute minus the number of amicus briefs opposing
the statute. Larger positive values on this variable indicate
greater support for the statute among the amici; negative values
indicated that briefs opposed to a statute outnumbered those in
favor. We thus expect a negative coefficient on this variable (the
more amici in support, the less likely the justice will vote to
strike the statute).
Civil Liberties. The nature of the legal issues presented to
the Court may also affect the justices' decisionmaking. Historically, the Court has been particularly protective of civil liberties
claims grounded in the Bill of Rights, and some of these claims
invoke the "strict scrutiny" standard of review of legislation.'~
Hence, we expect such statutes to be more subject to invalidation and include the nature of the claim as a dummy variable,
coded as 1 if a civil liberties challenge was brought to the statute,
and 0 otherwise.
Lower Court Invalidation. The Supreme Court often selects
cases in order to reverse the lower court. To control for this selection effect, our models include a dummy variable indicating
whether the lower court (usually a Circuit Court of Appeals) invalidated the statute (coded as 1) or upheld it (coded as 0).

1K. See, e.g .. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The lnjluem:e of Amiws
Brief.\ 011 1he Supreme Courl. 14H U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
1'}. See Gerald Gunther. The Supreme Corm, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doclrine 011 a Clumging Courl: A Model jiJr a Newer Equal Prole<.:lion. H6
HARY. L. REV. 1. K (1972) (famously proclaiming that such review was stnct m theory
but fatal in fact).
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2. Results

Table 2: Logit Model of Justices' Voting Behavior in Cases
Involving Judicial Review of Legislative Enactments, 1986-2004
(with hypothesized direction of coefficients)
Variable

Justice Ideology (+I-)
Alignment with
Statutory Direction (-)
Ideology* Federal
Statute (-)

Modell
Federal Laws
-.117
(.070)*
-.352
(.056)***

Model2
State Laws
.223
(.078)**
-.207
( .061 )***

.002
(.005)
-.869
(.265)***
-.249
( .208)

-.001
( .001)
-.802
(.119)***

Federal Statute (-)
Age of Statute ( +1-)
SG Support- Amicus (-)
SG Support-Party(-)
SG Oppose-Amicus(+)
Amicus Differential (-)
Civil Liberties
Challenge ( +)
Lower Court
Invalidation (-)
Constant

-.020
( .030)
.574
( .227)**
.184
(.136)*
-.788
(.277)**

Pseudo R-Square

.074

Wald Chi-Square
N

158.78***
865

.661
( .179)***
-.019
(.014)t
.338
(.121)***
-.422
(.089)***
.341
(.125)**
.089
1082.17**
*
1600

Model3
All Laws
.113
(.065)**
-.260
(.047)***
-.316
(.070)***
-.581
(.218)**
-.001
(.001)
-.817
(.116)***
-.529
(.149)**
.529
(.149)***
-.023
(.013)*
.420
(.063)***
-.222
(.075)**
.360
( .183)*
.082
838.57***
2465

*p<.lO, p<.05, **p<.Ol, ***p<.001. All estimated using Stata 8.2 with
robust standard errors clustered on the individual justice. Significance
tests are one-tailed.
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The three models presented in Table 2 reflect a complex
portrait of the justices' votes in judicial review cases involving
constitutional challenges to legislative enactments. First, it is
clear from the tables that judicial ideology is a critical determinant in the justices' voting behavior in judicial review cases. In
Model 1, the Justice Ideology variable is statistically significant
and negative. This indicates that liberals are less inclined to
strike federal legislation and conservatives more likely to do so,
directly contradicting our hypothesis that conservatives would
show more judicial restraint than liberals. In Model 2, the opposite ideological influence is evident with respect to state and local legislation, with conservatives less likely and liberals more
likely to vote to strike the law at issue. Finally in Model 3, the interactive term between ideology and federal laws is negative and
significant, confirming conservatives are significantly less deferential toward federal laws compared to state laws.
The Alignment variable measures the effect of congruence
between the justices' policy preferences and the substantive effects of the statute being reviewed. In all three models the
Alignment variable is highly significant and in the expected direction. Thus, for all justices, activism is closely related to ideology, as justices are much less likely to invalidate a law that is
ideologically aligned with their preferences and more likely to
vote to invalidate when the law contradicts their policy preferences.
As for the control variables, most of them are statistically
related to the dependent variable in the expected directions. The
justices plainly respond to the position of the Solicitor General,
whether the Solicitor participates as a party or amicus. In addition, with the exception of Model 1, the extent to which a positive differential exists between briefs filed in support of the statute and those filed in opposition to it affects the justices'
willingness to strike legislation. At least in the case of state or local laws, therefore, the justices are sensitive to public opinion as
expressed through amicus briefs filed by interest groups. Furthermore, the nature of the constitutional challenge matters: in
civil liberties cases, the justices are more willing to vote to strike
legislation, possibly because of the more stringent legal tests that
are often applied in those cases. And the control for the nature
of the Court's agenda is also statistically significant, yet the
models reveal that the lower court variable operates differently
in different contexts. Thus, in Model 1, if the lower court struck
the statute below, the justices were also more likely to strike the
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statute. This outcome is different than what we expected, given
the justices' propensity to reverse. But in the context of a challenge to a federal statute, it may be that lower court judges exercise caution in considering a constitutional challenge and choose
to invalidate federal statutes only in extreme cases. In Model 2,
however, the variable is in the expected direction (negative). At
least in the case of state or local laws, the justices are likely to
vote to reverse the lower court. Finally, the age of the statute at
issue did not influence the justices' votes in any of the models.

B. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Our second analysis involves judicial review of federal
agency decisions. In the context of administrative action the
connections between judicial restraint and the democratically
elected branches are not as obvious as in the case of legislative
enactments. Yet even though many administrative personnel are
themselves unelected, agency officials, even those of independent regulatory commissions, are more accountable for their policymaking decisions than are judges. Judicial restraint implies
deference to decisions of administrative agencies because agency
officials are subject to the ongoing supervision of the President
and Congress.
Presidents have many ways to influence administrative and
regulatory policy. The President chooses the top levels of bureaucratic personnel, and through these appointments exerts
2
control over bureaucratic policy. " Elena Kagan notes that every
president since Ford has required proposed Federal Regulations
to be approved by the White House before being issued, and can
use executive orders and other tools to direct administrative actions.21 Although administrative personnel are not elected, they
are closely accountable to the president.
Congress controls the statutory authority and operating
budgets which empower agencies. These tools give Congress a
great deal of leverage over agency decisions. McCubbins and
Schwartz, in their seminal paper likening congressional supervision of agency policymaking to "fire alarms" or "police patrols,"
explained that Congress has a myriad of indirect ways to monitor

20. See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman. The Dvnamics of Poliliwl Cwuro/
uf !he Bureaucracy, HS AM. POL. SCI. REV. HOI (I '!'!I): ~olan McCarty & Rose
Razaghian. Advice and Consem: Senate Responses /o Execlllive Branch Nomi!llllions
l/'11'15-JIJ'Jn. 43 AM. J. POL. SCI II22 (I'!'!'!).
21. See Elena Kagan. Presidemial Admini.llrlllion. II4 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (200I).
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22

agency policymaking. Even if Congress is not actively supervising the agencies, citizens and groups who oppose agency actions
will bring them to Congress' attention. Congressional committees can then hold hearings or conduct investigations into agency
actions. Weingast and Moran present empirical evidence that
congressional preferences influenced the Federal Trade Commission in the 1970s and 1980s, even without visible intervention
2
into the commission's activities. ) More recently Balla and
Wright have shown that Congress can ensure that its views are
represented in agency policymaking processes by influencing the
24
membership of agency advisory boards. It is clear that Congress
possesses significant tools to influence the actions of both executive and independent agencies, and that it has both the means
and the incentive to exercise these tools. Because agencies are
subject to continuous monitoring and control by both Congress
and the President, their decisions are more closely connected to
representative institutions than are court decisions.
1. Hypotheses
Given the agencies' ties to the elected branches, the same
principles of judicial restraint should apply in this context as in
the case of legislative enactments. Thus, if conservative justices
are more committed to judicial restraint, this commitment
should show up in a decreased likelihood of overturning the decisions of administrative agencies. The primary hypothesis with
regard to the Court's administrative law jurisdiction is that conservative justices will be less likely than liberal justices to vote to
overturn decisions made by administrative agencies.
The argument for judicial restraint may be stronger when
the agency whose decision is being litigated is within the executive branch. Presidents exercise closer control over these agencies, primarily because they can fire the heads of such agencies.
Therefore, the connection between the democratic process and
agency decisions may be closer in the context of executive
branch agencies. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that the
tendency of conservative justices to be more deferential to the de22. Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz. Congressional Oversighr Overlooked: Police Parro/.1· versus Fire Alarms. 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165,165 (19114).
23. Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran. Bureaucralic Discrerion or Congressional
Conrrol~ Regularory Policymaking hy rhe Federal Trade Commission. 91 J. POL. ECON.
765 (19113)
24. Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, lnreresl Groups, Advisory Commiuees. and
Congressional Conrrol ofrhe Bureaucracy. 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 799 (2001).
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cisions of administrative agencies will be more pronounced when
the decision was made by an executive branch agency.
As discussed above, there is reason to believe that the personal ideologies of justices will influence their votes. Sheehan's
1990 study s~o~s that ~upBort for agency decisi?ns is strongly related to thetr tdeologtes. · For example, Justtce Douglas supported 85 percent of liberal agency decisions, but only 33 percent
of conservative agency decisions. These findings lead to a third
hypothesis: a justice will be more likely to support administrative
action when the policy effects of that action are consistent with the
justice's policy preferences.
To evaluate these hypotheses, we identified all cases heard
by the Rehnquist Court during the 1986 through 2004 Terms in
which the action of a federal administrative agency was challenged. Once we had identified the cases involving challenges to
administrative action, we again used the Rehnquist Court Justice-Centered Database to construct our dependent variables.
This coding process resulted in dichotomous dependent variables. In the context of challenges to administrative actions, the
dependent variable is coded 1 if the justice voted to overturn the
agency action and 0 otherwise. Our data included 2114 votes in
cases involving challenges to administrative actions.
2. Model
With the above background and hypotheses, we operationalized variables to capture the qualities necessary for a test of
the hypotheses, similar to the analysis of legislative invalidations.
This section sets out and describes the independent variables
and nature of the statistical test.
Justice Ideology. We hypothesize that conservative justices
will be less likely to vote to overturn agency decisions. To indicate the justices' ideological predispositions we again use Martin
and Quinn's Ideal Point Scores as discussed above. Alignment
with Agency Action is calculated as in the analysis involving
Alignment with Statutory Direction, based on the ideological direction of the agency decision being reviewed. We expect higher
levels of alignment to lead to lower propensity to overturn the
agency action.

25. See Regmald S. Sheehan. Administrlllive Agencies and the Court: A Reexamination of the Impact of Agency Type on Decisional Outcomes. 43 W. POL. Q. 875 (1990).
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Agency Policy Direction is a categorical variable coded 1
when the agency is arguing for a conservative policy position and
-1 when the agency is advocating a liberal policy outcome. We
computed this variable using the Spaeth database's variables indicating the ideological direction of the lower court decision and
the appellant or respondent status of the government agency. If
the lower court decision was liberal, the agency policy position is
coded as conservative if the agency is the appellant and liberal if
it is the respondent. If the lower court decision was conservative,
the agency policy position is coded as liberal if the agency is the
appellant and conservative if it is the respondent. Previous research has found that liberal agency decisions garner more sup2
port from Supreme Court Justices. '
Executive Branch Agency is a dummy variable coded 1 if the
agency is within the executive branch and 0 if it is not. The inclusion of this variable is motivated by research investigating
whether executive branch or independent agencies fared better
27
in the Supreme Court. It is used to evaluate whether agencies
under the political control of the president are more or less successful at attracting support from the justices.
Party of President is a dummy variable coded 1 when the
President is Republican and 0 when the President is a Democrat.
In our data the only Democratic President is Clinton. This variable is included to control for the ideology of the sitting presi2
dent. '
Lower Court Support for Agency Action is a dummy variable indicating that the lower court (usually a Circuit Court of
Appeals) supported the agency action, introduced because of the
Court's proclivity to reverse.
To evaluate our hypotheses, we present three models. We
separately estimate the effects of the independent variables on
the justices' decisions in disputes emerging from executive
branch agencies and from independent agencies, and then combine these data to evaluate their effects in both types of cases.
As noted, the dependent variable is dichotomous and so we utilize logistic regression to estimate our model; given the potential
that the justices' individual votes would not be independent
26. See Jeff Yates. Presidential Bureaucratic Power and Supreme Court Justice Vot.
ing. 21 POL. 8EHA V. 349 (1999).
27. See Donald W. Crowley. Judicial Review of Administrative Agencres: Does the
Type of Agency Mauer~. 31 W. POL. Q. 265 (19k7): Sheehan, supra note 25. . .
28. This political relationship has been suggested by research. See Jeffrey Yates.
supra note 26.
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across cases, we again clustered on the individual justice. We
present the results of our data collection process and model estimation below.
3. Results
The three columns of numbers in Table 3 relate to justices'
votes in cases emerging out of independent agencies, executive
branch agencies, and all agencies, respectively. Our first hypothesis, that conservative justices would be less likely to vote to
overturn agency actions, suggests that Justice Ideology should
have a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable.
However, the negative, and very nearly significant (p=.100), coefficient for Justice Ideology in the first column shows that liberal justices showed more support for independent agencies than
conservatives.
Moving to the second column of numbers, Justice Ideology
docs show the positive and significant relationship with the dependent variable predicted by the first hypothesis. With a coefficient (.105) nearly three times the size of its standard error
(.039), this variable is highly significant and persuasively shows
that conservative justices were more likely than liberal justices to
defer to the decisions of executive branch agencies. The similarly
positive and significant coefficient for Justice Ideology in the
third column of numbers shows that this relationship persists
when decisions from both types of agencies are considered. The
negative and significant coefficient just below, for Justice Ideology *Independent Agency, reflects the fact that conservative justices are significantly less likely to support decisions by independent agencies compared to decisions by executive branch
agencies. This result supports the second hypothesis, that conservative deference to administrative decisions will show up
more in cases coming out of executive branch agencies than in
cases coming out of independent agencies.
Our third hypothesis concerns the effect of alignment between the justices' assumed policy preferences and the effect of
the agency decision being evaluated. The Alignment with Agency
Action variable reflects this relationship. The negative and significant coefficients for this variable in all three columns indicate
that justices are significantly less likely to vote to overturn decisions whose policy results they support. This result supports our
third hypothesis, and shows that justices' ideologies are important in determining their stances toward agency decisions.
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Table 3: Logit Model of Justices' Voting Behavior in Cases
Involving Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Decisions,
1986-2004
Variable

Justice Ideology ( +)

Model 1
Independent
Agencies

Model 2
Executive
Agencies

Model3
All
Agencies

-.089
( .070)

.105
( .039)***

.104
(.039)**
-.184
(.049)**

Justice Ideology*
Independent Agency (-)
Alignment with Agency
Action (-)

-.399
(.026)***

-.203
(.022)***

-.255
(.020)**

Agency Policy
Direction(+)

.299
(.085)***

.173
(.043)***

.204
(.042)**

Party of President at
Time of Court Decision

-.382
(.174)**

.280
(.135)*

.085
( .126)
.100
( .1 08)

Independent Agency
Lower Court Support
for Agency Action(+)

.684
(.154)***

.359
(.099)***

.473
(.104)**

Constant

-.733
(.203)***

-.916
(.113)***

-.927
(.164)***

Pseudo R-Square

.126

.051

.065

Wald Chi-Square

241.13***

225.73***

365.61 ***

645

1469

2114

N

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.OOl. All estimated using Stata 8.2 with robust
standard errors clustered on the individual justice. Significance tests
are one-tailed.

The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 show that, in certain
situations and after controlling for other likely influences, conservative justices are indeed more reluctant to overturn laws and
agency decisions. However, the highly significant effects of
Alignment with Statute's Direction (Table 2) and Alignment with
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Agency Action (Table 3) show that policy agreement also influences these decisions. The regression results presented so far
cannot tell us how much difference these factors make, but we
can use these results to predict the probability that a particular
justice will overturn a law or agency decision in particular circumstances. The next section does just that.
C. THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY AND ALIGNMENT ON
JUSTICES' DECISIONS

Table 4 shows the predicted probabilities that justices with
the ideological scores of Scalia, O'Connor, and Stevens would
2
vote to declare state or federal laws unconstitutional. " The top
four lines in the table relate to a conservative justice with the
same ideological score as Justice Scalia. These results suggest
that the source of the law does make some difference to a Justice
like Scalia. For example, Justice Scalia's likelihood of opposing a
liberal state law is .330, or four percent lower than his probability of opposing a liberal federal law (.373). Likewise, Justice
Scalia's probability of opposing a conservative state law (.121) is
about two percent lower than his probability of opposing a conservative federal law (.143). However, the effects of the source
of the law are dwarfed by the effects of the ideological nature of
the law.

2Y. The values in the table are calculated under the assumption that there are five
more amicus briefs in favor of striking the laws than in favor of upholding the laws, that
the law in question does not concern civil liberties. that the Solicitor General has submitted an amicus brief in support of the law, and with the other independent variables set at
their means.
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Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Vote to Strike Legislation
Justice
Simulated

Source of
Statute

Statute
Direction

Probability of
Vote to Strike

Scalia

State

Liberal

.330

Scalia

State

Conservative

.121

Scalia

Federal

Liberal

.373

Scalia

Federal

Conservative

.143

Stevens

State

Liberal

.292

Stevens

State

Conservative

.356

Stevens

Federal

Liberal

.162

Stevens

Federal

Conservative

.206

O'Connor

State

Liberal

.316

O'Connor

State

Conservative

.188

O'Connor

Federal

Liberal

.281

O'Connor

Federal

Conservative

.164

According to the model, the probability that Justice Scalia
would vote to strike a liberal state law is .330, while the probability that he would vote to strike a conservative state law is only
.121. This means that the change from a liberal to a conservative
law lowers Justice Scalia's probability of voting against the law
by about 21 percent. Similarly, these values show that Justice
Scalia's probability of opposing a liberal federal law is .373,
about 23 percent greater than his probability of opposing a conservative federal law (.143).
Moving to a more liberal Justice, such as Stevens, changes
the results somewhat. Stevens' probability of voting to overturn
a liberal state law is .290, while his probability of voting to overturn a liberal federal law is .162, showing that he is about 13 percent more likely to vote against a state law compared to a federal
law. On the other hand, the differences in Stevens' predicted
levels of support for liberal as opposed to conservative laws
shows that the Stevens is about eight percent more likely to support liberal laws compared to conservative ones.
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The bottom section of table 4 presents similar predictions
for a Justice with Sandra Day O'Connor's ideology. As with Justice Scalia, the liberal or conservative nature of the law has a
much greater impact on O'Connor's predicted votes compared
with whether the law came from a state or the national government.
Moving to the predicted probabilities that justices will vote
to overturn the actions of administrative agencies in Table 5, we
see a similar story."' Justice Scalia is about 15 percent more likely
to vote against liberal agency decisions compared to conservative ones, but only about 7 percent more likely to vote against
independent agency decisions compared to executive branch deClSlOnS.
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Vote to
Invalidate Agency Action
Probability of
Vote to Invalidate Agency Action

Justice
Simulated

Type of
Agency

Agency
Policy
Direction

Scalia

Executive

Liberal

.390

Scalia

Executive

Conservative

.237

Scalia

Inde12endent

Liberal

.466

Scalia

lnde12endent

Conservative

.297

Stevens

Executive

Liberal

.264

Stevens

Executive

Conservative

.552

Stevens

Inde12endent

Liberal

.304

Stevens

Inde2endent

Conservative

.453

O'Connor

Executive

Liberal

.347

O'Connor

Executive

Conservative

.327

O'Connor

Inde12endent

Liberal

.364

O'Connor

IndeEendent

Conservative

.345

. 30. These probabilities were calculated with all mdependent variables except Juslice Ideology. Alignment "'ith Agency Decision, and Agency Policy Position set at their
means.
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For Justice Stevens, the effect of the ideological consequences of the agency decision is striking. Stevens is nearly 30
percent more likely to vote to invalidate a conservative decision
by an executive branch agency compared to a liberal decision by
such an agency. He is about 15 percent more likely to vote to
overturn a conservative decision by an independent agency,
compared to a liberal decision by the same type of agency. Justice Justice Stevens is four percent less likely to vote to invalidate a liberal decision by an executive branch agency than a liberal decision by an independent agency (.264 versus .304).
However, when it comes to conservative decisions, Justice Stevens is nearly 10 percent more likely to support executive branch
decisions compared to decisions made by independent agencies.
The bottom four lines of Table 5 present the predicted
probabilities using Justice O'Connor's ideological score. Note
that for Justice O'Connor the model generates predictions that
are affected only slightly by the liberal or conservative nature of
the agency decision, or the source of the decision.
Overall, these predicted probabilities suggest that both the
source of the law or action under consideration and its ideological implications can exert meaningful influence on the likelihood
that a justice will vote to overturn it. However, in most cases the
effect of ideology appears to matter more than whether the law
was made by the state or federal government, or whether the
agency decision came out of the executive branch or an independent agency.
CONCLUSION
Our findings yield some interesting conclusions about the
association of conservatism and judicial restraint. The justices'
votes in these cases are structured by their ideologies in two
ways: ideology influences their responses to the source of the
policy under review, as well as to the substantive content of the
challenged policy. Conservative justices, like liberals, are ideological in their decision making but temper their ideologies with
respect and deference for certain institutions. Conservatives
show deference to state decisions and those of the executive
branch, while not extending this deference to actions of the national legislature and the independent regulatory agencies often
viewed as its agents. It appears that conservative justices do not
show more judicial restraint across the board, but instead show
deference to different institutions than do liberal justices.
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The empirical results pertaining to constitutional review of
laws suggest that conservative justices are more likely to show
restraint when evaluating state laws, but liberals are more likely
to show restraint when dealing with federal laws. Similarly, the
results pertaining to review of administrative actions indicate
that conservative justices show restraint (relative to liberal justices) when considering executive branch agency decisions, but
not when considering decisions of independent agencies. It may
be that, rather than a broad commitment to judicial restraint,
these results indicate commitments to two different political
principles: federalism and executive authority. Indeed, a comprehensive commitment to judicial restraint would presumably
extend to the decisions of national lawmakers and independent
agencies. It is difficult to see why members of Congress have less
legitimacy than state legislators. And, whatever one may think of
the constitutional status of independent regulatory and administrative agencies, if the justices are going to allow these agencies
to exist then presumably their decisions should be accorded legitimacy. Thus, it is possible that instead of judicial restraint
these results indicate a commitment to a particular understanding of the Constitution, one in which both states and the executive branch enjoy relatively great autonomy from legal restrictions (and the corresponding authority to put their preferences
into policy).
The second common point that emerges from these two sets
of analyses is that the justices' policy preferences are the dominant factor in their decisions. In all the analyses, a justice who
disapproved of the policy consequences of the law or decision
being challenged was much more likely to vote to overturn that
law or decision. The predicted probabilities in Tables 4 and 5
make this point very clearly. Thus, even though conservative justices showed greater judicial restraint in some contexts, their decisions (along with those of liberal justices) were overwhelmingly
the result of their views of good public policy.

